Showing posts with label Barry Ritholtz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Barry Ritholtz. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 30, 2017

Days of Yesteryear: Newspaper Edition

In high school, I eagerly awaited Sunday's newspaper so I could read syndicated columns by Dave Barry, Mike Royko, Thomas Sowell, and Charles Krauthammer, as well as the Calvin & Hobbes comic strip. I didn't care about anyone's political affiliation. Most writers who made it into the Sunday paper were undeniably authentic and had in-depth personal knowledge. I was interested because each of them cared about the topic discussed and provided relevant research, even if only anecdotal. If any journalist had a chip on his or her shoulder, I couldn't feel it on my ink-stained fingers. I would save articles I loved in my cabinet, a shrine to the many words of wisdom I felt lucky to read. 

A few days ago, when a newspaper--from the same publisher--unexpectedly arrived on my parents' porch, I went to throw it in the recycling bin, asking my mom along the way whether she wanted it. She demurred, and off to the bin it went, unopened. How times have changed. But why? 

Despite more information publicly available than ever before, I learn more about a scientific topic by speaking to my sister, a PhD scientist, for 5 minutes than anything online. Writers can fit only so much context in a short article, but they don't have much competition--the number of experts able to provide "big picture" context is extremely limited. As the always interesting Nassim Taleb might say, oftentimes, it's not what you say, but what you leave out. 

A lawyer/analyst recently published an article arguing record consumer debt wasn't a cataclysmic problem but missed an issue: are his numbers and data based on organic, sustainable growth--such as steady, predictable tax receipts--or artificial, unsustainable catalysts, such as government borrowing at ever-increasing interest rates? Without knowing the answer to the aforementioned question, the entire article as well as its research is useless. This author, the editor of the blog, The Big Picture, somehow missed the big picture--despite doing considerable research and using diverse data sets. 

I emailed him, saying, "You... failed to list overall liabilities, such as pension and other local gov obligations. If local and state govs borrow more and transfer their debt/revenue to local residents, of course the overall picture will appear better." 

He responded, "These are current, not future liabilities." 

This expert accepts an analytical approach where if 100 people owe 1 million dollars now and have jobs that can reasonably cover the interest on their debts now, it doesn't matter if their government--local, state, and federal--or their private sector employer owes 100 billion in bond or other payments due tomorrow. 

But without knowing present and future liabilities, one cannot determine whether last year's tax receipts and accompanying job growth are sustainable. If governments or private employers owe 100 billion tomorrow, they might require higher taxes, fewer new hires, and more debt (presumably at different interest rates, impacting present-day revenue). 

If the debt is pension-related, then more revenue would be needed to replace the retired workers as well as to pay ongoing pensions unless the pension fund was 100% funded. In short, future liabilities can dramatically change the assumed rates of job growth, tax revenue, consumer demand and inflation, rendering prior data almost useless. It's as if there's a Black Swan event we can actually predict, but no one wants to do the additional math because it's too complicated. 

So I wrote Barry Ritholtz back: "[I]f we have a bill due tomorrow, analyzing only today's liabilities and GDP makes no sense if the entire structure depends on rolling over massive debt and other financial engineering." 

That's when it got interesting--and slightly snippy: 

My response: 

The value you were trying to provide was context, not knocking down a strawman, I hope. 

If since 2007, govs have borrowed more money and transferred that money to their residents on local, state, and fed levels while doing little to resolve systemic issues such as lowering pension obligation interest rates, etc., then the result won't be the same. It'll be different, of course, but serious problems will remain, meaning your article promotes complacency rather than true context.  You want the "big picture"? So do I. 

Barry: "See how it's totally not the same because of a lack of defaults and overall population and other changes that I'm going to examine without trying to see if the growth is merely because govs borrowed more money?" 

Skeptical Guy: "Dude, analyzing only today's data makes no sense if you're unable to determine that consumer/mortgage borrowing wasn't merely replaced by gov borrowing, which then was transferred to residents, leaving systemic issues alive and well, but with a larger fuse and more dependence on low interest rates."  

Barry: "Dude, I was just analyzing why it ain't exactly the same." 

Guy: "What value is that if your goal is to analyze the big picture?"

And that's where the conversation ended.  

When I opened my newspaper in the 1990s, I never once suspected Mike Royko wasn't an expert on everything Chicago. When Peggy Noonan taught me politics is all about "Whose ox is being gored," I knew she was speaking from a reservoir of personal experience. Today, in contrast, when I click on content, I sense people consider themselves experts after one-hit wonders or because they know the "right" people. Worse, I sense journalists and experts no longer have power behind their pen. Even if they manage to capture eyeballs, the public's threshold for outrage has risen so high, nothing will be done unless an army of paid meme creators and politically-connected groups manufacture simplistic slogans that fail to capture any complexity. 

Maybe that should be the modern journalist's motto (and epitaph): "So simple, you'll be outraged and demand change without really understanding a damn thing." 

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Team Mark Cuban

Interesting battle between two major bloggers and superstars. Barry Ritholtz compliments Mark Cuban but also points out that Mr. Cuban seems to be contradicting himself unless he has an edge. The original thread is here. I wanted to share my thoughts, and while I am usually on Mr. Ritholtz's side, in this case, he's missed the big picture.

Mr. Cuban has always maintained two overall themes: 1) the stock market has morphed into a casino, far from its original purpose, which was to help entrepreneurs expand their businesses; and 2) financial advisors and Wall Street have so many conflicts of interest, they are inherently dishonest and no longer consider retail investors’ interests. (Quite frankly, both of these themes are 100% correct.)

Mr. Ritholtz's comments seem to hold Mr. Cuban to a strange standard, i.e., If Cuban says the market is rigged and you should be in cash, bonds, or CDs, what exactly is his "edge" in giving this investment advice? The problem is that you don’t need an “edge” to be in cash. For most non-traders, the point of having a cash-centric portfolio is to avoid volatile investments. Mr. Cuban was just pointing out that the average retail investor is usually at a disadvantage in the stock market, meaning s/he should be in cash or another investment that is not subject to the whims of Wall Street bankers.

Thus, criticizing Mr. Cuban for his lack of an investment “edge” seems nonsensical, because he’s not giving investment advice–as Mr. Ritholtz himself admits. Mr. Cuban is just trying to guide people to a savings vehicle that does not require an edge. Now, if someone wanted to criticize Mr. Cuban in non-straw-man fashion, s/he could mention two things:

1) in the absence of 8% money market accounts, bonds and CDs, most of us rely on stock market gains to fund our retirements, because most of us don’t have billions of dollars in the bank; in other words, after a certain financial point, one does not need to subject himself to the whims of Wall Street (I still remember Ted Turner saying that he keeps all his money in Treasuries). However, since most people are not in Mr. Cuban’s financial position, his advice seems questionable in the absence of persistent deflation; and

2) being in cash has been a terrible move over the long run (30+ years) due to inflation, and therefore Mr. Cuban’s advice is not helpful to retail investors who lack billions of dollars for retirement. In short, Mr. Cuban’s 10 year time horizon is too short and conveniently selective, because under Bogle’s, Graham’s and Buffett’s theories, investors should be prepared to hold stocks for 30+ years to smooth out returns.

Perhaps Mr. Ritholtz is trying to start something with Mr. Cuban to get more readers. As an avid fan of both men, I have no problems with his strategy. I also continue to wonder if the average long-term investor is best served by Mr. Cuban's all-cash advice.

Update: Kedrosky interview (6/29/10) with Mark Cuban here:

So that’s when I kind of gave up my widows and orphans approach and started trading stocks and that was the early 90s and it worked out very, very, very well for me. I think I took that $3 million, which is about $2 million after tax, and turned it into about 10x, just having boom years. Which a lot of people did in technology in the 90s and that was just, you know, from probably 1990 to 1995.

Ah, the 90's. Good times.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Barry Ritholtz: Look Out Below?

According to today's post, hedge fund manager and author Barry Ritholtz says: 

We have been mostly cash since May 5th (as much as 100% then, 50% cash in June). We are now over 80% cash, and are looking for a move down towards 950 on the SPX. 

950 on the S&P 500 means a 20% drop from today's prices. Still, don't HPQ and some other tech names seem tempting at current (8/24/10) prices? Mr. Ritholtz seems to be betting that the Democrats--which control both the White House and Congress--will do nothing about a 20% stock market decline, even with elections arriving soon. 

More from Barry Ritholtz here

Disclosure: I own shares of HPQ.

Monday, March 8, 2010

Barry Ritholtz on Madoff

As usual, Barry Ritholtz gets it right:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/03/what-were-the-actual-losses-in-madoffs-fraud/

Love the example about the trillion dollars. Doesn't it seem that "trillion" will be 2010's word of the year?

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Barry Ritholtz on 9/11

Barry Ritholtz talks about Bush and 9/11 here. A snippet:

When people ask why I dislike the presidency of George W. Bush, it was that colossal failure to rise to greatness on that occasion, and indeed, to engage in a series of decisions that not just in retrospect, but at the time, simply reflected terrible judgment.

Unlike many others, I only blame W in small part for ignoring the warning pre-9/11. But for the catastrophic series of decisions that followed, I hold him 100% accountable.

After 9/11, the entire world supported the United States of America. Iranians held candlelight vigils. NATO pledged immediate support. What the heck happened from September 2001 to November 2008, and why did it take so long for Americans to reject Bush's policies?

The comments on Barry's blog are also worth reading--here's one from "How the Common Man Sees It":

Though we are quite in agreement on economic matters, I am a conservative Christian that disagrees with you on many issues and I have told you so many times.

This one is not one of them.

One of the greatest failings of the modern conservative movement is its inability to admit when it was wrong. The desire to circle the wagons is only making their circle smaller. That provides for even less protection in the long run. I am beginning to believe that conservatives created, or at least inflamed the rebellion of the ’50’s and ’60’s due to rigidness alone. I just hope we learn in time so that we aren’t lost in the wilderness for another generation. The Western world can no longer afford a one party state.

HERE is my post on terrorism, titled, "The Unusual Suspects."

More links:

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moussaoui/zmsamit.html

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=david_frasca

http://blogs.state.gov/

Thursday, July 16, 2009

Book Review: Barry Ritholtz's Bailout Nation

I'm a huge fan of Barry Ritholtz. His blog, The Big Picture, accurately predicted the most recent stock market collapse; as a result, Mr. Ritholtz gained millions of fans. Not being content with blogging and television appearances, Mr. Ritholtz published a book, Bailout Nation. His thesis is that excessive financial leverage, lax regulation, and government incompetence and cronyism caused our current economic crisis.

Bailout Nation is geared towards the general public, i.e., non-experts. If you have been waiting for an easy-to-read, thorough explanation about how we reached our current economic crisis, Bailout Nation is for you.

The flip side of making Bailout Nation so accessible is that long-time market followers will not be surprised by most of book's substantive content. In addition, I was disappointed that Mr. Ritholtz used a more formal writing style for his book. On his blog, Mr. Ritholtz brings an irreverent tone that makes him a delight to read. In fact, I've called Mr. Ritholtz the "Anthony Bourdain of Wall Street" because of his intelligent, devil-may-care style. (Jim Cramer would be Rachael Ray, of course.) Fans of The Big Picture, where curse words are used on a semi-regular basis, will be disappointed to know that I found only one curse word (on page 165).

Perhaps Mr. Ritholtz sanitized his writing style to reach a broader audience. (Either that, or Aaron Task, his editor, had a heavy hand in the book.) Whoever decided to sanitize Mr. Ritholtz made a mistake. As anyone who's read his blog posts can tell you, one reason people love Mr. Ritholtz is because he's the opposite of uptight. In fact, if there was ever such a thing as a "blue-collar" banker, Mr. Ritholtz would be it. There are too few people on Wall Street who have inside knowledge of the business and who are willing to take on the big boys (like Goldman Sachs) with panache. When you are one of the very few people on Wall Street who told people to get out of the market before it collapsed, your record speaks for itself--you don't need a dry, Utah-esque writing style to gain anyone's credibility. Even though readers won't see much of Mr. Ritholtz's normally informal style, don't let it stop you from reading the book--it's not quintessential Barry, but it's still pretty darn good.

Mr. Ritholtz starts out by telling us the "modern era of finance is now defined by the bailout...Perhaps what the government should be doing is acting to prevent systemic risk before it threatens to destabilize the world's economy, rather than merely cleaning it up and bailing out out afterward." (page 5) He then distinguishes between corporate welfare--bailing out individual companies--and broad-based stimulus plans, noting that the "public works programs of the Depression era were designed to impact the entire economy," not a few politically-connected groups. (page 11)

Although Mr. Ritholtz singles out the government's 1971 Lockheed Martin bailout, which he believes paved the way for other taxpayer-backed boondoggles, he places much of the blame on the banking sector and the Federal Reserve. His scorn for former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan is palpable. Mr. Ritholtz believes Greenspan actively aided and abetted the financial and housing bubbles when his job was to prevent bubbles, not make them. (As Charlie Munger once said, "Greenspan overdosed on Ayn Rand.") Given the ripple effects of the banking sector's collapse on the general economy, Thomas Jefferson's quote--that "Banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies"--seems all too prescient today. (page 15)

Mr. Ritholtz then surveys the financial damage, and it is heartbreaking. "[A]s of March 2009, the S&P 500 was back at levels below where it was [in] 1996...If you bought the broad index [in 1996] some 13 years later you would have nothing to show for it." (page 66) The market's reversion to 1996 levels makes sense, because so much perceived wealth creation was based on false housing valuations. Most of us know that consumers used their homes as piggy banks, but I was unaware of the extent to which this occurred. Mr. Ritholtz says that "the impact of mortgage equity withdrawal [MEW] has been nothing short of breathtaking: MEW was responsible for more than 75 percent of GDP growth from 2003 to 2006." (page 96)

It doesn't get better, unfortunately. Mr. Ritholtz slams us with another shocking statistic: "From 2001 to 2008, the [American] greenback lost nearly 40 percent of its purchasing power." (page 106)

One reason Mr. Ritholtz may have seen the crisis coming was because of the unreasonable yield spread between U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed CDOs. He points out the absurdity in having mortgage-backed CDOs rated the same as U.S. Treasuries but paying a much higher interest rate: "These CDOs rewrote the laws of economics. They promised to be as safe as U.S. Treasuries, but paid out a significantly higher yield. In other words, for the same exact risk, the reward was much greater. This should have been recognized as an impossibility...Someone would either be winning a Nobel Prize in economics--or going to jail." (page 113)

Mid-way through the book, Mr. Ritholtz mentions the "net capital rule." "From 1975 to 2004, this was the primary tool used to prevent investment banks from taking on too much leverage. The rule limited their ratio of debt to net capital to 12 to 1; in other words, $12 was the maximum they could borrow for every $1 in capital." (page 143) After 2004, however, the net capital rule did not apply to major investment banks.

After reading about the SEC's relaxation of the net capital rule, I made up my mind--the economic collapse occurred because the SEC allowed a small number of investment banks to take on an unholy amount of leverage. How much more leverage? Well, in 2004, the SEC exempted investment firms with a market capitalization of over $5 billion from the net capital rule. Thus, Goldman, Lehman, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley were no longer governed by the 12 to 1 limit. These investment firms promptly increased leverage dramatically, sometimes up to a 40 to 1 ratio. Welcome to Wall Street on steroids. Initially, the growth looks good to you and everyone else, but the shrinkage is inevitable. Or, as Mr. Ritholtz writes,

Thus we learn that the tragic financial events of 2008 and 2009 are not an unfortunate accident. Rather, they are the results of a conscious SEC decision to allow these firms to legally violate net capital rules that had existed for decades, limiting broker-dealers' debt-to-net-capital ratio to 12-to-1. You couldn't make this stuff up if you tried. (page 144)

The paragraph above sums up the book for me, but Mr. Ritholtz isn't done. He talks about the fact that "We in the United States have lived beyond our means for many years. " (page 210) As a result, we are dependent on the kindness of foreigners willing to fund our spendthrift ways, and once "you begin to depend on the kindness of strangers, it's best not to make those strangers too angry." (Id.) So, "Why bail out overseas counterparties and debt holders? One gets the sense Uncle Sam had little choice in the matter." (Id.) I echoed Mr. Ritholtz's conclusion here in September 2008:

The money belongs mostly to the Japanese and Chinese, who have lent us trillions of dollars by buying up U.S. debt, bonds, and preferred shares. If we want them to continue financing our lifestyle—-which they will do, because few other places contain citizens so willing to spend—-they set the terms of the bailouts, not us...In large part, international investors are willing to forgive our transgressions because of the bailouts.

Or, as the joke goes, "I just took out a dollar bill to buy coffee and the bill had the inscription, 'Made in China.' Is this going to be a problem?" It's funny, in a Weimar Republic sort of way.

Lest you think Mr. Ritholtz favors bailouts, don't worry--he later writes, "We cannot have privatized profits and socialized risks." (page 227) I wholeheartedly concur. If you're interested in reading about the seeds of the current economic crisis, you'll enjoy Barry Ritholtz's book.

English Majors Unite: on page 199, "tax deferred" is spelled "tax defered."

Note: page numbers refer to the 2009 hardcover edition, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Disclosures: the publisher provided me with a complimentary copy of Bailout Nation. I do not currently have a financial stake with the author or the publishing company.

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

My Meeting with FusionAnalytics

Fans of Barry Ritholtz might enjoy this post. As most of you know, Mr. Ritholtz is the CEO and Director for Equity Research for FusionIQ, an independent quant research firm. He works with Kevin Lane and Michael Conte of FusionAnalytics Investment Partners, LLC. I happened to meet Mr. Lane and Mr. Conte yesterday morning.

Mr. Lane provided some details about his background. He started with MFS and then became Redwood's Chief Market Strategist. When margins on the trade execution side of the business diminished, Mr. Lane shifted gears into market research. Mr. Lane appears to focus part of his research on answering the following three questions:

1. What are the underlying fundamentals?
2. Are we in the right sector?
3. What is the overall market environment?

Mr. Lane is a quant--someone who relies on numerical ("quantative") techniques to time the market and to determine market risk. I asked his thoughts on LTCM, the most famous quant-based blow-up in Wall Street history (read the book, When Genius Failed, for more on this topic). This is where Mr. Lane differentiated his product from other quant-based tools. Many quants believe so religiously in their system, even when the data in front of them tells them a trade isn't working out, they ignore it. In contrast, Mr. Lane mentioned human error and being able to recognize when you've made a mistake. Though he didn't come out and say it, he implied that LTCM fell prey to hubris. Mr. Lane also said that when his own bets on Tempur Pedic International Inc. (TPX) and La-Z-Boy Inc. (LZB) went awry, he exited those positions. His decision to take the loss sooner rather than later saved his investors from more downside movement. Overall, I found Mr. Lane to be upfront and professional. He clearly had passion for his work, and his eyes lit up when he began talking about his investment strategies.

I then spoke with Mr. Conte. If Mr. Lane is the gravitas of the operation, then Mr. Conte is the suave go-getter, the East Coast stud who brings energy and drive to every meeting. Mr. Conte talked about the FusionAnalytics program and how it sought to minimize investment risk. He used the term, "tilt," instead of portfolio "re-balancing," saying it was important to allocate assets in the right direction rather than just haphazardly. Actually, he said it more colorfully--he said that rebalancing doesn't make sense, because you could be rebalancing into toxic assets, except he used a scatalogical term for "toxic assets," which made me laugh.

Mr. Conte also talked about conflicts of interest and how many brokers and advisors had no incentive to protect their clients' money. For example, let's say you recommend a stock to your clients. A few months later, the technical indicators show that the stock is poised for a dive. In most firms, there's no incentive to go back to your clients and tell them you were wrong a few months ago and they should sell. That's because many Wall Street firms don't prioritize protecting their clients' money--their models are based on getting as much money as you can and giving your clients bullish tips. Mr. Conte said FusionAnalytics avoided this conflict of interest by charging a percentage of assets under management, allowing them to focus on results.

As I've written several times before, it's important for investors to see investment advisors and corporate executives in person to gauge their credibility. Human intuition, honed for thousands of years, may not always be correct, but it can sometimes save investors a lot of grief. One reason Madoff might have secluded himself from his investors and created an exclusive (read: isolated) existence is probably because he knew his lies would produce tell-tale signals. Mr. Conte and Mr. Lane both came across as credible, decent men. I wouldn't be surprised to see them doing very well in the future. In a world where a Madoff can exist, it's nice to know that a Mike Conte and a Kevin Lane can also thrive.

One final note: during my chat with Mr. Conte, we experienced a 4.3 earthquake. This was Mr. Conte's first earthquake, and I got to share it with him. It's always good to see how investment advisors operate under pressure. Mr. Conte's face got a little red when he realized what was happening, but he kept his composure. Mr. Conte, welcome to California.

FYI: here is an article re: Mr. Lane's timely calls:

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_50/b3812104.htm

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Bank Market Caps

Barry Ritholtz almost always has great stuff on his blog, The Big Picture. Here's one particularly interesting post, showing how much banks have declined in value:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/02/bank-market-caps-then-now/

Oh, the lack of prudence.

Monday, December 8, 2008

Barry's Picks

Barry Ritholtz, who manages around 100 million dollars, talks about investing:

We are now running about 70% cash, which is inordinately high, but some of the names we’re watching, and have owned in the past, are NuVasive [NUVA], a medical-device company, Stanley Works [SWK], a great infrastructure story, LG Display [LPL] and Luminex [LMNX]. Industries we like are infrastructure, defense, biotech and medical devices.

It's good to see a Wall Street insider mentioning specific company names as opportunities for investment. As for me, I do believe the market will go up, but the question is whether Obama's swearing-in in late January 2009 will represent a firm baseline, or a temporary peak for the stock market.

Thursday, October 9, 2008

I Was Wrong

My September 18, 2008 call of capitulation was wrong. See call after the jump:

http://willworkforjustice.blogspot.com/2008/09/capitulation-is-hereagain-good-times-to.html

But today, on October 9, 2008, I feel like I called the bottom only a few weeks too early--which isn't a capital crime. Here is my take on the current situation, which I posted on Barry Ritholz's website:

It all depends on GE and Google. That's it--the double G's will determine whether we make or lose money. No other real catalyst on the horizon--interest rates have been cut, and money pumped in, so both the money supply and interest rates have been manipulated. After HP's positive earnings, I am feeling sanguine, despite the blood on the streets.

I bought a commodity fund for my 401k today, T Rowe Price's New Era fund. Being relatively young, I am a buyer at these levels. I just wish I had more gunpowder. My Roth IRA is already fully invested.

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Capitulation is here...again (Good times to follow)

For anyone who has monies in a 401k, a Roth IRA, or some other retirement account and is under 35 years old, now may be a good to enter the market and use up some of that financial gunpowder.

From Barry Ritholtz: "The criminal enterprise, formerly known as Russia, has decided to halt trading. With its stock market down 57%, Putin & Co. are being even more risk averse than Paulson, Bernanke, et.al. & Co."

You know times are bad when Russia halts trading. But people with a long-term horizon of at least ten to fifteen years may want to add to existing positions. The economy and the stock market go through boom-bust cycles, and you can't enjoy the boom unless you get in on the bust. I've personally seen my retirement funds decline in value by over 10,000 dollars in the last two to three months. I've continued adding to positions, especially in the Asian markets. Barring some cosmic wrath directed at me, I don't need the retirement money now, tomorrow, or even ten years from now.

From Warren Buffett: "We simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy, and to be greedy only when others are fearful."

If this isn't fear in the air I smell, maybe it's eu de depression. Come November, we will have a change, with either candidate bringing fresh ideas to the White House (McCain with less tolerance for pork and corruption, and Obama with, well, Obama). Good times will be here again, because a) we can (or should try harder to) learn from Japan's mistakes bailing out their banks; and b) financial services are still not that vital to an economy, once liquidity is restored.

We had a great economy back when Citigroup, BofA, and WaMa were just small or midsize banks. I still remember Citigroup being "just" 19 dollars during the heyday. Banks were never meant to be growth stocks. When they go back to paying a stable dividend, maintaining good credit profiles, and selling some insurance, the world will be a better place. And if I never have to hear about credit default swaps, I will be a happy man.

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Why Does Gasoline Cost $4 or More?

Here is a graphic from the Washington Post re: oil prices. I got this from Barry over at http://bigpicture.typepad.com a while ago:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/07/26/GR2008072601566.html?sid=ST2008072601558&pos=list

I disagree with the Barry "The Big Kahuna" Ritholtz on market capitulation (he is waiting for it, I don't think it will happen), but love his blog.

Thursday, July 31, 2008

Small Business Bankruptcies Increased

Barry Ritholtz writes about small businesses getting the shaft:

http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/07/what-do-bankrup.html

Small businesses in California and elsewhere are being overlooked as Congress and state legislators rely more on corporate donations. We need strong legislators who can help small businesses and who also have the skills to balance the interests of employers and employees. Without predictable regulations and more assistance to small businesses, the path to the American Dream will become limited to the slow hierarchy structure of your nearest mega-corporation. Clark Gable's character famously justified his profession as a freelance horse wrangler by saying, "Better than wages"--but at least he had a choice.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Joe Nocera Has a Blog

Barry Ritholtz pointed his readers to a new business blog that looks promising:

http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/

Joe Nocera is a business writer for the NY Times. Of course, his blog is not as good as Barry's, at least not yet:

http://bigpicture.typepad.com/

If you read one economics-related blog, read Barry's "The Big Picture."

Sunday, May 25, 2008

WSJ, May 20, 2008

The Wall Street Journal's May 20th edition contained a lot of fabulous "infoporn," as Barry Ritholtz of the "The Big Picture" blog likes to say. ("Chartporn" is another one of his favorite expressions.) See http://bigpicture.typepad.com/

1. "Economies in states that produce oil, gas and other commodities are stronger than the rest of the U.S." April 2008 Unemployment rates for Montana: 3.8%; North Dakota: 3.1%; Oklahoma: 3.2%; Texas: 4.1%; Wyoming: 2.6%. Interestingly enough, based on some other information I've seen, South Dakota is apparently doing better overall than North Dakota in terms of bank deposits. Maybe North Dakotans are more optimistic and spending more money instead of saving it like their neighbors down south?

2. For all credit card company investors and lovers of the recent Visa (V) IPO, check this out:

Default Deluge: monthly credit card losses at credit-card companies are at 6%--a three year high. (Page C14). Say it with me: upcoming recession?

3. Nothing, however, topped the article on home prices (D3). Apparently, construction companies went overboard in building condos in Chicago, so you can buy a condo for $85,000 in Bronzeville. The areas with the most supply appear to be Wicker Park, Ukrainian Village, and Bucktown (why doesn't San Jose have cool neighborhood nicknames?). With a possible Olympic bid, Bronzeville might be an interesting location. South Side...the "baddest part of town" no more?

Median Single Family Home Prices:

Boston: 357K
Chicago: 249K
L.A.: 459K
NY: 445K
S.F.: 701K