A reader made a comment to the post below, indicating that CNB might be worse off than its total debt and total cash numbers indicate. He is correct--almost all banks are difficult to value today, because it is almost impossible to determine what percent of the debtors will be able to pay back their loans. The reader pointed me to the following link:
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=5754137-104895-280327&type=sect&dcn=0001193125-08-037476
He believes that CNB is a risky investment because much of its debt is mortgage-related. Banks hold many different classes of assets--student loans, mortgage loans, small business loans, life insurance policies, home equity lines, and so forth. His analysis relies on an assumption that today, any bank holding significant mortgage-related or property-related loans in markets such as Florida, Nevada, and California will be distressed. I don't dispute that analysis; however, I also do not believe CNB deserves to be trading at 3 dollars a share, even with its risks. CNB will probably not collapse and as a result, five years from now, when property values recover, CNB will be lauded for being in high-growth areas.
In any case, CNB accelerated its earnings release to July 16, 2008. We will have a better idea of where the bank stands tomorrow. I can't imagine CNB would have accelerated its earnings release if there was worse-than-expected news involved, but common sense doesn't always apply in this panicked market.
"And if an epitaph be my story, I'd have a short one ready for my own: I had a lover's quarrel with the world." -- Robert Frost
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Colonial Bancgroup (CNB) Recap
One day after calling a bottom in well-capitalized banking stocks, Colonial Bancgroup (CNB) and First Horizon (FHN) increased 16% and 30%, respectively (at least as of 10AM PST on July 15, 2008).
I was able to make a short term trade on XLF as well--I put a limit order to buy last night, and when I woke up, it increased 4.3%, so I sold. I can't do a full stock update just yet, as the market isn't yet closed, and I will wait at least three weeks so I can get a better picture of how my stock picks are doing. In three weeks, most of the major companies will have released earnings.
For now, my main holdings are as follows, in descending order of worth: PFE, INTC, CNB, and DBV.
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
I was able to make a short term trade on XLF as well--I put a limit order to buy last night, and when I woke up, it increased 4.3%, so I sold. I can't do a full stock update just yet, as the market isn't yet closed, and I will wait at least three weeks so I can get a better picture of how my stock picks are doing. In three weeks, most of the major companies will have released earnings.
For now, my main holdings are as follows, in descending order of worth: PFE, INTC, CNB, and DBV.
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
Monday, July 14, 2008
Colonial Bancgroup (CNB)
Correction Note (on July 15, 2008): an astute reader from Seeking Alpha pointed I was misusing accounting terminology in my posting, namely how debt is characterized on a balance sheet. When a bank makes a loan, it becomes the creditor. As a result, its balance sheet lists the loan/debt as an asset.
In my article, I used Yahoo Finance's "total debt" and "total cash" figures, which do not appear to include loans as "assets." The "total debt" and "total cash" statistics provide some holistic insight into how much a bank might be over-leveraged. At the end of the day, the ability of debtors to pay their debts is paramount, not "total debt" or "total cash," and everyone is currently dealing with bankers' black boxes of credit quality. But I was able to call at least a short-term bottom--both FHN and CNB, jumped by around 30% and 16% (see full day's chart for July 15, 2008), respectively, one day after I called a bottom in well-capitalized banking stocks. My full article, published yesterday, is below:
I am calling a bottom in well-capitalized regional bank stocks. When the New York Times publishes an article titled, "Analysts Say More Banks Will Fail," (by Louise Story) we have a good contrarian indicator. But here's what makes me angry: the reporter cites Richard Bove in her article as support for her thesis that despite being better capitalized in general, more banks will collapse. Take a look at this Nightly Business Report link to an interview with Mr. Bove:
http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/080714c/
He expressly says he believes regional banks are in good condition:
"I think that the regional banks are actually in relatively good condition...I think if you look a year from now, the prices of bank stocks will be considerably higher than they are today."
Of course, he also says it is risky to bet on bank stocks now, in a time of panic, but overall, the clear sentiment is that the overwhelming majority of banks are healthy. The article itself states that 150 out of 7,500 banks might fail--or just 2%.
I have been very disappointed in my own stock picking ability because I bet on Colonial Bancgroup (CNB). While I bought almost all of my shares at under 5 dollars, the market has decided that CNB is worth only 3 dollars a share. I continue to believe I am correct, and the market is being irrational. The question is whether I can stay solvent until the market becomes rational again.
Bank stock financial data are abstruse because they defy normal value analysis. Usually, value investors like myself look at a company's total cash and total debt. My own personal yardstick is to deem a company undervalued if its net cash exceeds 10% of its market capitalization. For example, Intel has a market cap of 108 billion. Therefore, I want its net cash to be at least 10.8 billion before I view it as undervalued. Intel has about 11 billion in net cash, passing my test (I own shares in Intel).
Banks, on the other hand, cannot be analyzed in this way, because they make money through loans. As a result, Shakespeare's advice, "Neither a borrower nor a lender be," doesn't apply. In addition, a bank having more debt does not necessarily denote irresponsible spending. Indeed, as an investor, you want your bank to have more debt, because banks make money by loaning to others, not by keeping their cash. The problem lies in evaluating whether a bank's debt (or, in accounting terms, its assets, because they are technically the creditor) is likely to be repaid by its debtors. As debtors default on loans, they cause an immediate downward spiral: the bank that loaned them money has to stop lending others as much money; perhaps raise the rate on its CDs to attract more money; and take other steps that decrease its ability to take advantage of normal business conditions. What we forget is in a non-panicked world, banks have the easiest job: they get money from the Fed Reserve or their depositors at 2.25%, and then loan out the money at 5.5% or more. They make an automatic 3.25% just for being a middleman. (You can see why online banks are even better--they eliminate the fixed costs of a bank, like its numerous tellers/employees, ATM machines, and physical structures, and just get paid for being a middleman, minus the normal overhead. That's why an online bank like ING can offer higher CD rates.)
Having established that a bank's financial data cannot be analyzed in the same way as a non-bank's, how do we ascertain whether a bank might go under? One informal measure might be to measure the amount of total cash vs. total debt. It's a similar analysis as above, except that in these precarious times, if a bank has too much debt relative to its cash deposits, it is more likely to collapse. All figures are from Yahoo Finance's "Key Statistics" pages as of July 14, 2008:
IndyMac, which has collapsed, had about 2 billion in total cash and 11 billion in debt. That's a 9 billion dollar difference.
Washington Mutual has 15 billion in total cash and 97 billion dollars in total debt. That's an 82 billion dollar difference.
Regions Financial has 5.5 billion in total cash and 29.5 billion in total debt, a 24 billion dollar difference.
M&T Bank, considered to be a healthy, well-capitalized bank, has 2 billion in total cash, and 16.8 billion in total debt, a difference of almost 15 billion.
US Bancorp has 7.3 billion in total cash and 72.6 billion in total debt, a 65.3 billion dollar difference.
Wells Fargo, considered to be a conservative lender, has 25 billion dollars in total cash, and 157 billion dollars in total debt, or a difference of 132 billion. This high level of debt is very surprising. Warren Buffett extolled the virtues of Wells Fargo in a recent annual shareholder letter, and Mr. Buffett is the classic value investor. Wells Fargo might have a high debt load because it didn't sell off its loans to Wall Street and held them on its own books instead, but I am just speculating. As a direct holder of the debt, Wells Fargo can hold it till kingdom come, and would have no external pressure to dump loans at a discount. In some ways, its refusal to spread its risk creates an advantage. (I own some shares in Wells Fargo.)
Now we come to Colonial Bancgroup, or CNB. CNB has 2.5 billion in total cash and 5.3 billion in total debt, a 2.8 billion dollar difference. It has the lowest total debt of any other bank above, and plenty of cash relative to its debt.
Whatever you may think of banks collapsing, CNB probably won't be among them--its debt load just isn't high enough to make a collapse imminent. At 3.36 dollars a share, if you have an iron will, you may want to consider buying 1000 shares and leaving it alone for a while. A prudent investor would probably wait until after July 21, 2008 to buy, because CNB reports earnings on July 21, 2008. I will hold onto my 1100 shares of CNB and be patient--like Wells Fargo, I can wait a long time, but I hope next week brings good tidings and immediate vindication.
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
In my article, I used Yahoo Finance's "total debt" and "total cash" figures, which do not appear to include loans as "assets." The "total debt" and "total cash" statistics provide some holistic insight into how much a bank might be over-leveraged. At the end of the day, the ability of debtors to pay their debts is paramount, not "total debt" or "total cash," and everyone is currently dealing with bankers' black boxes of credit quality. But I was able to call at least a short-term bottom--both FHN and CNB, jumped by around 30% and 16% (see full day's chart for July 15, 2008), respectively, one day after I called a bottom in well-capitalized banking stocks. My full article, published yesterday, is below:
I am calling a bottom in well-capitalized regional bank stocks. When the New York Times publishes an article titled, "Analysts Say More Banks Will Fail," (by Louise Story) we have a good contrarian indicator. But here's what makes me angry: the reporter cites Richard Bove in her article as support for her thesis that despite being better capitalized in general, more banks will collapse. Take a look at this Nightly Business Report link to an interview with Mr. Bove:
http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/080714c/
He expressly says he believes regional banks are in good condition:
"I think that the regional banks are actually in relatively good condition...I think if you look a year from now, the prices of bank stocks will be considerably higher than they are today."
Of course, he also says it is risky to bet on bank stocks now, in a time of panic, but overall, the clear sentiment is that the overwhelming majority of banks are healthy. The article itself states that 150 out of 7,500 banks might fail--or just 2%.
I have been very disappointed in my own stock picking ability because I bet on Colonial Bancgroup (CNB). While I bought almost all of my shares at under 5 dollars, the market has decided that CNB is worth only 3 dollars a share. I continue to believe I am correct, and the market is being irrational. The question is whether I can stay solvent until the market becomes rational again.
Bank stock financial data are abstruse because they defy normal value analysis. Usually, value investors like myself look at a company's total cash and total debt. My own personal yardstick is to deem a company undervalued if its net cash exceeds 10% of its market capitalization. For example, Intel has a market cap of 108 billion. Therefore, I want its net cash to be at least 10.8 billion before I view it as undervalued. Intel has about 11 billion in net cash, passing my test (I own shares in Intel).
Banks, on the other hand, cannot be analyzed in this way, because they make money through loans. As a result, Shakespeare's advice, "Neither a borrower nor a lender be," doesn't apply. In addition, a bank having more debt does not necessarily denote irresponsible spending. Indeed, as an investor, you want your bank to have more debt, because banks make money by loaning to others, not by keeping their cash. The problem lies in evaluating whether a bank's debt (or, in accounting terms, its assets, because they are technically the creditor) is likely to be repaid by its debtors. As debtors default on loans, they cause an immediate downward spiral: the bank that loaned them money has to stop lending others as much money; perhaps raise the rate on its CDs to attract more money; and take other steps that decrease its ability to take advantage of normal business conditions. What we forget is in a non-panicked world, banks have the easiest job: they get money from the Fed Reserve or their depositors at 2.25%, and then loan out the money at 5.5% or more. They make an automatic 3.25% just for being a middleman. (You can see why online banks are even better--they eliminate the fixed costs of a bank, like its numerous tellers/employees, ATM machines, and physical structures, and just get paid for being a middleman, minus the normal overhead. That's why an online bank like ING can offer higher CD rates.)
Having established that a bank's financial data cannot be analyzed in the same way as a non-bank's, how do we ascertain whether a bank might go under? One informal measure might be to measure the amount of total cash vs. total debt. It's a similar analysis as above, except that in these precarious times, if a bank has too much debt relative to its cash deposits, it is more likely to collapse. All figures are from Yahoo Finance's "Key Statistics" pages as of July 14, 2008:
IndyMac, which has collapsed, had about 2 billion in total cash and 11 billion in debt. That's a 9 billion dollar difference.
Washington Mutual has 15 billion in total cash and 97 billion dollars in total debt. That's an 82 billion dollar difference.
Regions Financial has 5.5 billion in total cash and 29.5 billion in total debt, a 24 billion dollar difference.
M&T Bank, considered to be a healthy, well-capitalized bank, has 2 billion in total cash, and 16.8 billion in total debt, a difference of almost 15 billion.
US Bancorp has 7.3 billion in total cash and 72.6 billion in total debt, a 65.3 billion dollar difference.
Wells Fargo, considered to be a conservative lender, has 25 billion dollars in total cash, and 157 billion dollars in total debt, or a difference of 132 billion. This high level of debt is very surprising. Warren Buffett extolled the virtues of Wells Fargo in a recent annual shareholder letter, and Mr. Buffett is the classic value investor. Wells Fargo might have a high debt load because it didn't sell off its loans to Wall Street and held them on its own books instead, but I am just speculating. As a direct holder of the debt, Wells Fargo can hold it till kingdom come, and would have no external pressure to dump loans at a discount. In some ways, its refusal to spread its risk creates an advantage. (I own some shares in Wells Fargo.)
Now we come to Colonial Bancgroup, or CNB. CNB has 2.5 billion in total cash and 5.3 billion in total debt, a 2.8 billion dollar difference. It has the lowest total debt of any other bank above, and plenty of cash relative to its debt.
Whatever you may think of banks collapsing, CNB probably won't be among them--its debt load just isn't high enough to make a collapse imminent. At 3.36 dollars a share, if you have an iron will, you may want to consider buying 1000 shares and leaving it alone for a while. A prudent investor would probably wait until after July 21, 2008 to buy, because CNB reports earnings on July 21, 2008. I will hold onto my 1100 shares of CNB and be patient--like Wells Fargo, I can wait a long time, but I hope next week brings good tidings and immediate vindication.
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
Primordial Scream, Economic-Style
It's times like these I just want to tear my hair out. I just bought some FHN (under 2,000 dollars' worth, so I am not including them in my Stocks Update), as well as another 100 shares of CNB. But CNB went down around 13% today, so now I have 1100 shares and a lot less confidence in my stock picking abilities. After the Fed Reserve came out and assured everyone that FNM and FRE would not go under, small bank stocks still went down based on the IndyMac collapse, a poor earnings report from M&T Bank, and National City's woes. All three banks were having issues, which reflected on FHN and CNB.
Still, FHN and CNB are priced as if they are going to fail. That is far from the case. The "Texas ratio" is a good financial rule of thumb that assists investors in determining whether a bank will fail. The ratio is calculated by dividing a bank's non-performing loans, including those 90 days delinquent, by the company's tangible equity capital plus money set aside for future loan losses. The Texas ratio shows to what extent a bank is overleveraged; how well its loans are doing; and whether it has the capital to continue suffering losses on loans without failing or needing to raise more capital. Any ratio 100 or over means the bank may fail and is in the zone of bankruptcy. IndyMac had a Texas ratio of 125 prior to its collapse. But FHN and CNB have Texas ratios of around 25%. CNB releases earnings on July 21; FHN releases earnings on July 17 [Update: FHN released earnings today after its stock price went down 25%; in afterhours trading it was up 5%].
USB releases earnings tomorrow. It is said to be a much more stable bank, and its earnings may provide better guidance about whether CNB and FHN will have good news this week and next week.
If any major bank is going to go under, I don't think it's going to be CNB or FHN. Unless their earnings/losses are especially horrendous--and their stock prices reflect normally horrendous losses--they should be okay. The word on the street is that Washington Mutual is teetering on the brink. I have an account there, and I am not concerned because FDIC insurance will protect my deposits and my clients' deposits.
These are truly crazy times for banks and American capitalism. I hope two years from now, my readers and I can read this posting and smile. Right now, however, I am just shocked at how irrational this market is. "Encephalic apoplexy" seems like an appropriate term to describe what I am feeling, because I am used to being right about the market.
[On the bright side, I did successfully day-trade some GE shares today.]
Still, FHN and CNB are priced as if they are going to fail. That is far from the case. The "Texas ratio" is a good financial rule of thumb that assists investors in determining whether a bank will fail. The ratio is calculated by dividing a bank's non-performing loans, including those 90 days delinquent, by the company's tangible equity capital plus money set aside for future loan losses. The Texas ratio shows to what extent a bank is overleveraged; how well its loans are doing; and whether it has the capital to continue suffering losses on loans without failing or needing to raise more capital. Any ratio 100 or over means the bank may fail and is in the zone of bankruptcy. IndyMac had a Texas ratio of 125 prior to its collapse. But FHN and CNB have Texas ratios of around 25%. CNB releases earnings on July 21; FHN releases earnings on July 17 [Update: FHN released earnings today after its stock price went down 25%; in afterhours trading it was up 5%].
USB releases earnings tomorrow. It is said to be a much more stable bank, and its earnings may provide better guidance about whether CNB and FHN will have good news this week and next week.
If any major bank is going to go under, I don't think it's going to be CNB or FHN. Unless their earnings/losses are especially horrendous--and their stock prices reflect normally horrendous losses--they should be okay. The word on the street is that Washington Mutual is teetering on the brink. I have an account there, and I am not concerned because FDIC insurance will protect my deposits and my clients' deposits.
These are truly crazy times for banks and American capitalism. I hope two years from now, my readers and I can read this posting and smile. Right now, however, I am just shocked at how irrational this market is. "Encephalic apoplexy" seems like an appropriate term to describe what I am feeling, because I am used to being right about the market.
[On the bright side, I did successfully day-trade some GE shares today.]
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Stocks Update
I had sold some PFE at 18.33 but still hold many shares. I sold my GE prior to the earnings report, taking the 6% loss. I added to my CNB position, which swung from an unrealized 3% gain to an unrealized 11% loss. I also received dividends, which are not factored into the calculations below. If I pick stocks well, my picks should do well even without factoring in dividends.
Thus far, it appears I am doing slightly better than the overall market, but this is bittersweet, given that the S&P 500 has lost over 10% in less than two months. I had removed most of my money from the market two months ago, so I am not concerned--yet. "The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent," the saying goes. Thankfully, all of my open positions are in retirement accounts, so I can wait for years until the market becomes rational again.
One benefit of keeping track of my trades is I can see which styles work for me. So far, it is clear I am better off with short term trades (100% positive record) than long term ones. I place very large bets when making short term trades, and smaller bets when establishing longer term positions. Therefore, it's as if I bet 5,000 dollars on red in roulette, win quickly, but then give some of my gains back when I overestimate my intelligence and go play poker for a few hours with a 1,000 dollar buy-in.
Open Positions
CNB = -11.5
EQ = -8.0
EWM = -8.54
IF = -11.8
PFE = -7.22
Average of "Open Positions": losing/negative average of 9.41%
Closed Positions:
Held more than seven days but less than one year:
GE = -6.4
PNK = -16.7%
PPS = -2.8
WYE = +2.4%
Held less than 7 days:
GE (1.0%); ICE (2.0%), MMM (0.5%), MRK (0.1%), PFE (1.3%), SCUR (15%) (Overall record in this category is a 3.31% average gain)
Daytrades:
PFE = +0.5%
GE = +0.5% (Updated on July 14, 2008; bought at 27.15, sold at 27.30)
XLF = +4.3% (Updated on July 15, 2008)
Average of "Closed Positions" sub-categories, except for Daytrades: losing/negative 4.59%
Combined Total Averages, excluding Daytrades: losing/negative 7.0%
Compare to S&P 500: losing/negative 10.5%
[from May 30, 2008 (1385.67) to July 13, 2008 (1239.49)]
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
Thus far, it appears I am doing slightly better than the overall market, but this is bittersweet, given that the S&P 500 has lost over 10% in less than two months. I had removed most of my money from the market two months ago, so I am not concerned--yet. "The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent," the saying goes. Thankfully, all of my open positions are in retirement accounts, so I can wait for years until the market becomes rational again.
One benefit of keeping track of my trades is I can see which styles work for me. So far, it is clear I am better off with short term trades (100% positive record) than long term ones. I place very large bets when making short term trades, and smaller bets when establishing longer term positions. Therefore, it's as if I bet 5,000 dollars on red in roulette, win quickly, but then give some of my gains back when I overestimate my intelligence and go play poker for a few hours with a 1,000 dollar buy-in.
Open Positions
CNB = -11.5
EQ = -8.0
EWM = -8.54
IF = -11.8
PFE = -7.22
Average of "Open Positions": losing/negative average of 9.41%
Closed Positions:
Held more than seven days but less than one year:
GE = -6.4
PNK = -16.7%
PPS = -2.8
WYE = +2.4%
Held less than 7 days:
GE (1.0%); ICE (2.0%), MMM (0.5%), MRK (0.1%), PFE (1.3%), SCUR (15%) (Overall record in this category is a 3.31% average gain)
Daytrades:
PFE = +0.5%
GE = +0.5% (Updated on July 14, 2008; bought at 27.15, sold at 27.30)
XLF = +4.3% (Updated on July 15, 2008)
Average of "Closed Positions" sub-categories, except for Daytrades: losing/negative 4.59%
Combined Total Averages, excluding Daytrades: losing/negative 7.0%
Compare to S&P 500: losing/negative 10.5%
[from May 30, 2008 (1385.67) to July 13, 2008 (1239.49)]
The information on this site is provided for discussion purposes only and does not constitute investing recommendations. Under no circumstances does this information represent a recommendation to buy or sell securities or make any kind of an investment. You are responsible for your own due diligence.
Stock Market Week Recap: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Contrary to my belief that GE's earnings would be some kind of bellwether for the overall market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stole the show. GE had set expectations so low, when it beat its own lowered expectations, the market barely noticed.
Meanwhile, Fannie (FNM) and Freddie's (FRE) stock prices got cut in half after liquidity concerns arose. What are Fannie and Freddie, and why are they so important? I realized I didn't really know much about these institutions, which hold between five to six trillion dollars in debt.
According to its own website, FNM "operates in America's secondary mortgage market to ensure that mortgage bankers and other lenders have enough funds to lend to home buyers at low rates." FRE's business sounds similar:
We connect Main Street – the residential mortgage market – to Wall Street – dealers and investors – through our mortgage purchase, credit guarantee and portfolio investment activities.
Our customers are predominately lenders in the primary mortgage market. Our activity in the secondary mortgage market supports a continuous flow of funds to the primary market, which leads to consumer benefits in the form of a steady flow of low-cost mortgage funding.
What is a secondary mortgage market? It's when a bank gives you a mortgage and then wants to spread its risk around. If it holds onto your loan, and you don't pay, then it is the only entity on the hook. But if it sells the right to future interest payments and/or principal in your loan to someone else, it reduces its reliance on one source of profit. Another way to reduce risk is to have more people involved in a deal, so if one person pulls out, there are plenty left to handle the remaining issues. So most banks re-package their mortgage loans and put them into one big "debt pie" (my own term) and then instead of holding onto the pie, they sell slices to other entities. The bank cuts the "debt pie" into several pieces, some better than others, and sells off its loans at different prices to investors who want to receive the monthly mortgage payments and/or interest.
FRE and FNM get a fee for repackaging various banks' mortgage loans and shouldering the risk that the borrower might not repay the principal or the interest. By allowing banks to place everyone and their mortgages into a large pie, the banks spread their lending risks and possibly get some immediate cash back to make more loans.
The problem is that the pie slices kept getting sold off to more and more buyers through even more complex financial instruments. When the music stopped, everyone forgot that someone had to pay the original mortgages or the game couldn't continue. Ironically, by trying to reduce the risks of lending, banks and FNM/FRE actually increased overall risk, because no one had an interest in making sure the original borrower paid up. The geniuses on Wall Street created no incentive to make sure the guy at the bottom had the papers or the income or the willingness to pay his/her mortgage, because everyone assumed that the original bank checked out the papers and did the due diligence. As we know, loan agents didn't always require tight documentation before submitting loan applications, but the banks that received the applications didn't care, because they knew they could put the loan into a large pie and sell it off and get paid. In violation of the philosopher Kant's ethical guidelines, the banks treated people as a means to an end, rather than an end, knowing they could dump the loans on someone else because FNM and FRE would guarantee them.
The U.S. government has decided that in order to encourage people to buy homes, it needs to support companies (FNM and FRE are both publicly traded and owned by shareholders, not the government) willing to buy up the "debt pies." It supports them by offering loans from the Federal Reserve's discount window, currently at 2.25%. Without this kind of support, the government believes banks would be less willing to make mortgage loans, thereby causing housing prices to decrease. Because most Americans have most of their net worth in their homes, if housing prices decrease, it would make them feel more poor and less willing to spend, causing a recession. As a result, the government has lent an implicit promise to FNM and FRE that they can make loans and will receive liquidity from the government to support American home ownership. This "promise" isn't written down anywhere, but the amount of debt pies held by FNM and FRE are staggering--again, it's around half the entire mortgage loan market, or around 5 to 6 trillion dollars. They are "too big to fail," as some might say.
Recently, the Federal Reserve, which holds taxpayer money (read: our money) refused to loan more money to FNM or FRE, causing their stock prices to decrease by around 50% [This just in: the Fed Reserve Bank of New York will lend money to FNM and FRE]. [Still,] In a worst case scenario, FNM and FRE have been guaranteeing mortgage loans that can't be repaid, in which case they have to reduce their mortgage guarantees, diminishing further demand in the housing market.
At the same time, this might be a welcome development, because by reducing the availability of mortgages, housing prices might decrease enough to allow more first time buyers to buy homes. A friend of mine reminded me not everyone should buy a home--some people are better off in apartments. This reality caused some cognitive dissonance because I am a firm believer in the American Dream including a home, but he is correct. Not everyone can afford to buy a home--some people's incomes are not steady or high enough to guarantee their ability to pay property taxes and repairs, much less the monthly payments on a home. In addition, FNM and FRE's business models work best if you assume housing prices will always increase, allowing homeowners to refinance to pay their mortgages in lean times or during a layoff. But there is no guarantee that housing prices will keep increasing, nor should the government "guarantee" infinitely increasing property prices. The problem, of course, is it looks like the government has done just that.
It appears that when the Fed lowered interest rates post-9/11, basically making money free to the public, it gave everyone a green light to buy a home. In retrospect, Mr. Greenspan didn't really have a choice--he had to open the money spigot to bring back American confidence. But neither Mr. Greenspan nor anyone else thought an Iraq war would last several years, or that oil would increase to 160 dollars a barrel. Therefore, people who blame Greenspan might want to look in the mirror first--the Iraq war, which the Democratic Congress continues to finance, has contributed to taking trillions out of the United States' economy and into non-productive areas, destroying the value of the American dollar. In time, when Iraq's oil fields are producing oil at full capacity, the war might make more sense. But for now, Congress needs to commit to a balanced budget and restore the world's faith in the American dollar. Fannie and Freddie are just symptoms of an overall refusal by our government to restrict spending.
On a personal note, I can't figure out the difference in FRE and FNM, but apparently, Congress approved FRE to counteract FNM's monopoly. If someone can explain the difference between Fannie and Freddie, please add to the comments section. In addition, I can't figure out if FNM and FRE just get paid a fee for buying the loans from the bank and then dumping them on someone else, or if they hold onto some percentage of the mortgage loans.
Also, do FNM and FRE line up a buyer for the loans in advance of buying them from the banks? If not, then they could be stuck with trillions of loans on their own books. If they do have loans on their books they can't dump on someone else, and they go bankrupt, what happens if the government doesn't bail them out? I think the banks would get screwed, but not the homeowner, as long as s/he's paying his mortgage. That means we could have major banking collapses, but that's a shareholder matter, unless the FDIC gets involved. It is also probably cheaper to pay FDIC guarantees than FNM/FRE loans. Of course, if the government doesn't support FNM/FRE, and lets the banks shoulder the risk, the entire banking system collapses, because Americans would take their money out of banks, causing an IndyMac situation (i.e., if bank deposit holders think their bank is going under, they will remove the capital the bank is using to fund other loans, causing the bank to collapse). Sigh. It really doesn't look good, folks. Any comments are appreciated.
Meanwhile, Fannie (FNM) and Freddie's (FRE) stock prices got cut in half after liquidity concerns arose. What are Fannie and Freddie, and why are they so important? I realized I didn't really know much about these institutions, which hold between five to six trillion dollars in debt.
According to its own website, FNM "operates in America's secondary mortgage market to ensure that mortgage bankers and other lenders have enough funds to lend to home buyers at low rates." FRE's business sounds similar:
We connect Main Street – the residential mortgage market – to Wall Street – dealers and investors – through our mortgage purchase, credit guarantee and portfolio investment activities.
Our customers are predominately lenders in the primary mortgage market. Our activity in the secondary mortgage market supports a continuous flow of funds to the primary market, which leads to consumer benefits in the form of a steady flow of low-cost mortgage funding.
What is a secondary mortgage market? It's when a bank gives you a mortgage and then wants to spread its risk around. If it holds onto your loan, and you don't pay, then it is the only entity on the hook. But if it sells the right to future interest payments and/or principal in your loan to someone else, it reduces its reliance on one source of profit. Another way to reduce risk is to have more people involved in a deal, so if one person pulls out, there are plenty left to handle the remaining issues. So most banks re-package their mortgage loans and put them into one big "debt pie" (my own term) and then instead of holding onto the pie, they sell slices to other entities. The bank cuts the "debt pie" into several pieces, some better than others, and sells off its loans at different prices to investors who want to receive the monthly mortgage payments and/or interest.
FRE and FNM get a fee for repackaging various banks' mortgage loans and shouldering the risk that the borrower might not repay the principal or the interest. By allowing banks to place everyone and their mortgages into a large pie, the banks spread their lending risks and possibly get some immediate cash back to make more loans.
The problem is that the pie slices kept getting sold off to more and more buyers through even more complex financial instruments. When the music stopped, everyone forgot that someone had to pay the original mortgages or the game couldn't continue. Ironically, by trying to reduce the risks of lending, banks and FNM/FRE actually increased overall risk, because no one had an interest in making sure the original borrower paid up. The geniuses on Wall Street created no incentive to make sure the guy at the bottom had the papers or the income or the willingness to pay his/her mortgage, because everyone assumed that the original bank checked out the papers and did the due diligence. As we know, loan agents didn't always require tight documentation before submitting loan applications, but the banks that received the applications didn't care, because they knew they could put the loan into a large pie and sell it off and get paid. In violation of the philosopher Kant's ethical guidelines, the banks treated people as a means to an end, rather than an end, knowing they could dump the loans on someone else because FNM and FRE would guarantee them.
The U.S. government has decided that in order to encourage people to buy homes, it needs to support companies (FNM and FRE are both publicly traded and owned by shareholders, not the government) willing to buy up the "debt pies." It supports them by offering loans from the Federal Reserve's discount window, currently at 2.25%. Without this kind of support, the government believes banks would be less willing to make mortgage loans, thereby causing housing prices to decrease. Because most Americans have most of their net worth in their homes, if housing prices decrease, it would make them feel more poor and less willing to spend, causing a recession. As a result, the government has lent an implicit promise to FNM and FRE that they can make loans and will receive liquidity from the government to support American home ownership. This "promise" isn't written down anywhere, but the amount of debt pies held by FNM and FRE are staggering--again, it's around half the entire mortgage loan market, or around 5 to 6 trillion dollars. They are "too big to fail," as some might say.
Recently, the Federal Reserve, which holds taxpayer money (read: our money) refused to loan more money to FNM or FRE, causing their stock prices to decrease by around 50% [This just in: the Fed Reserve Bank of New York will lend money to FNM and FRE]. [Still,] In a worst case scenario, FNM and FRE have been guaranteeing mortgage loans that can't be repaid, in which case they have to reduce their mortgage guarantees, diminishing further demand in the housing market.
At the same time, this might be a welcome development, because by reducing the availability of mortgages, housing prices might decrease enough to allow more first time buyers to buy homes. A friend of mine reminded me not everyone should buy a home--some people are better off in apartments. This reality caused some cognitive dissonance because I am a firm believer in the American Dream including a home, but he is correct. Not everyone can afford to buy a home--some people's incomes are not steady or high enough to guarantee their ability to pay property taxes and repairs, much less the monthly payments on a home. In addition, FNM and FRE's business models work best if you assume housing prices will always increase, allowing homeowners to refinance to pay their mortgages in lean times or during a layoff. But there is no guarantee that housing prices will keep increasing, nor should the government "guarantee" infinitely increasing property prices. The problem, of course, is it looks like the government has done just that.
It appears that when the Fed lowered interest rates post-9/11, basically making money free to the public, it gave everyone a green light to buy a home. In retrospect, Mr. Greenspan didn't really have a choice--he had to open the money spigot to bring back American confidence. But neither Mr. Greenspan nor anyone else thought an Iraq war would last several years, or that oil would increase to 160 dollars a barrel. Therefore, people who blame Greenspan might want to look in the mirror first--the Iraq war, which the Democratic Congress continues to finance, has contributed to taking trillions out of the United States' economy and into non-productive areas, destroying the value of the American dollar. In time, when Iraq's oil fields are producing oil at full capacity, the war might make more sense. But for now, Congress needs to commit to a balanced budget and restore the world's faith in the American dollar. Fannie and Freddie are just symptoms of an overall refusal by our government to restrict spending.
On a personal note, I can't figure out the difference in FRE and FNM, but apparently, Congress approved FRE to counteract FNM's monopoly. If someone can explain the difference between Fannie and Freddie, please add to the comments section. In addition, I can't figure out if FNM and FRE just get paid a fee for buying the loans from the bank and then dumping them on someone else, or if they hold onto some percentage of the mortgage loans.
Also, do FNM and FRE line up a buyer for the loans in advance of buying them from the banks? If not, then they could be stuck with trillions of loans on their own books. If they do have loans on their books they can't dump on someone else, and they go bankrupt, what happens if the government doesn't bail them out? I think the banks would get screwed, but not the homeowner, as long as s/he's paying his mortgage. That means we could have major banking collapses, but that's a shareholder matter, unless the FDIC gets involved. It is also probably cheaper to pay FDIC guarantees than FNM/FRE loans. Of course, if the government doesn't support FNM/FRE, and lets the banks shoulder the risk, the entire banking system collapses, because Americans would take their money out of banks, causing an IndyMac situation (i.e., if bank deposit holders think their bank is going under, they will remove the capital the bank is using to fund other loans, causing the bank to collapse). Sigh. It really doesn't look good, folks. Any comments are appreciated.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Shareholder Meeting Tip
The Wall Street Journal published an unintentionally amusing blurb about Marks and Spencer's (M&S) shareholder meeting. Despite poor performance, M&S shareholders retained their CEO. The WSJ tried to explain the retention of the beleaguered CEO by saying, "Marks and Spencer may have helped lift the mood by offering the 1,636 investors free wine, cider, sandwiches and desserts beforehand." Compare that to Long's Drugs shareholder meeting, where they served just water and basic Milano cookies. A word to the wise in corporate departments: always have good refreshments or some kind of unique freebie at shareholder meetings--investors will give you free advertising and speak well of you, which provides a good return in the form of goodwill.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)