Showing posts with label Soviet Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Soviet Union. Show all posts

Saturday, April 18, 2020

A Building Divided against Itself Cannot Stand

Sabine Weyand, EU director-general for trade:

[Economic] Self-sufficiency is not an option for any country. It's not an option even for any continent.


Bloomberg, "Supply Lines," April 13, 2020: 

Regarding "ventilators, the breathing-assistance machines in short supply across the world [because of COVID-19]... Depending on the model, they can contain as many as 900 pieces sourced from all over the world."
 

We can argue manufacturing interdependence is unconscionably risky, but we can also acknowledge it's sensible for lower wage countries to take a higher share of more routine work. Yet, regardless of your beliefs on international trade, you probably don't know the historical basis for globalization, or even that a globalized economy does not have to be similar to the status quo

To better understand our current post-globalization era, think of the worldwide economy as two landlords in charge of two growing buildings. Until 1945, there were many landlords but most of them were inefficient or corrupt because they lacked a central office and/or the knowhow to attract and develop talent. Most landlords also had difficulty borrowing money and attracting investors on their own, hurting their chances of not only expansion but also basic maintenance. After 1945, only two landlords--the ones with the most sturdy manufacturing designs and access to oil--were able and willing to lease space to interested parties. All other landlords preferred local tenants, were bankrupted, or were indebted to one of the two remaining landlords.

As a duopoly, the two landlords initially agreed not to compete with each other. One landlord--ASU Corp--indirectly created non-competes within its own building by assigning its partners to lead production. As the most knowledgeable entity within the building, ASU used office leases as a launchpad for mutually beneficial long-term relationships. To minimize conflicts, ASU tenants would specialize in certain services and not compete with each other directly--at least not until tenants were able to master the basics of production and consumption. Under ASU's watchful eye, all tenants, as much as possible, would do business only with the landlord and with each other--and only under the landlord's protection, funding, legal principles, and guidance. 

The other landlord-- RSSU Cooperative--showed its strength by designing the most useful structures and facilities possible. It required its tenants to focus on farming/agriculture and infrastructure. In addition, each tenant had to sign a lease allowing the landlord an easement for technological/scientific testing. Like the other landlord, everyone would trade only with each other, but all the transactions in this building would be handled by the landlord, who would station one employee in each tenant's office to monitor trade and also to help facilitate transport and security. 

Over time, ASU's willingness to provide debt allowed its tenants to take more risks and to expand their own businesses--as long as they stayed current on interest and rent payments to ASU each month. ASU's status as creditor to its tenants meant it could dictate not just business strategy, but financial terms. Under ASU's leadership and advertising, transactions substantially increased between all tenants and also with the landlord. ASU's generous debt terms meant each transaction in its building benefitted from a multiplier effect, where the more tenants traded with each other, the better the chances that debts would be paid and values and prices would increase--for everyone. ASU aimed to master production and consumption, not just production.

RSSU, on the other hand, envisioned each tenant providing each other--as well as itself--with tangible and necessary items. It did not trust each tenant to set prices fairly or sustainably. As a result, while its consumers could satisfy all of their basic needs--except for food when harvests failed--each tenant lacked incentives to cater to consumers or to innovate in ways different from the landlord's expressly stated needs. 


I could continue, but you get the point. The multiplier effect of debt allowed one country to expand its influence at the expense of the other while also stealing much of the other's talent. Such economic expansion required continual fine-tuning of products, advertising, and supply chains so allies would not compete excessively with each other and would maximize the velocity of money. This system gave a single country the power to issue trillions of dollars of debt and to use its financial system--backed by tangible oil and intangible digital technology--as the backbone of the world's economy. Over time, as the United States ran deficits to sustain control over an economic system where it could make the rules, it began to lose influence because some savvy tenants were not in its building or refused to play by its rules. (Note: wherever there is a rule, someone subject to it is determining how to circumvent it in order to gain an advantage.)

Using the prior example, 
if a new landlord appears--we'll call this third landlord "ANIC"--and sells similar products cheaper than ASU's tenants, at some point conflicts are inevitable if ASU's deficits and its allies' debts assume ever-increasing values and prices. Moreover, the idea of agreed-upon specialization--whether in software, semiconductors, oil, or gas--looks naive if supply chains can be disrupted by a single tenant. (The USA's Middle Eastern military adventurism after 1973's OPEC embargo attempted to resolve this gap.) To summarize, if 900 pieces are needed to make a ventilator, a wise and trusted negotiator can create 900 friends and allies; however, if the primary negotiator's financial or security skills are deemed unreliable or capricious, opportunities to inspire 900 direct competitors becomes more likely. 

Once we realize trustworthiness is the true underlying foundation of a world economy spread out over multiple and distant countries, we know why the United States succeeded spectacularly from 1945 to 2001. In 1945, General George Marshall and General Dwight Eisenhower represented the best of the United States and used their strength to promote compassion, resolve, honor, and fairness. We need not cite any of their personal statements to prove the latter because the two countries they helped rebuild--Germany and Japan--are two of the most successful countries in the world today, with Tokyo the world's most advanced city in terms of infrastructure. In other words, while the Soviet Union--with its flag's hammer--desired the title of infrastructure expert, it was the United States under Eisenhower and Marshall that actually deserved it. Under these men, the world benefited from America converting its wartime manufacturing capacity to facilitate trade and movement within nations and between them. None of this trade, a version of sharing resources with debt tethering everyone together, would have been possible without trust. 

Fast-forward to 2020. Today's America, after the debacle of the Vietnam war, represents the visions of George Bush Sr., former CIA director, and Donald Trump, real estate developer. These two men view illegal tactics as necessary costs to weaken competitors while creating preferences for their own multi-national ambitions: malls, media, and majestic buildings plus a military designed to maintain currency stability by controlling the world's oil supply. We don't need a crystal ball to see that America in 2020 and in the near future is less likely to attract tenants/allies than America in 1945. 

In the meantime, more "tenants" will move to China's "building," though most will try to lease space with both China and the United States. Others, such as the EU, will try to become Landlord #3. Best case, this straddling will generate bridges between the "ANIC" and "ASU" buildings using a new industry of go-betweens; worst case, currency and legal complications (e.g., money laundering) will force tenants to choose a single lease. 

A "single lease" scenario would lead to a new 1945, where China and the U.S. carve out economic zones similar to the post-WWII East-West divide. (Think Checkpoint Charlie, but with tariffs, laws, and sanctions limiting movement rather than physical walls.)
The straightforwardness of the "single lease" scenario is appealing but would render the future dependent on the integrity and reasonableness of Chinese and American leadership. (Though I wonder: if we get a do-over, why does it feel like the U.S. is the old Soviet Union, and Iraq/Yemen its Afghanistan?) 

I predict most countries will improve domestic supply chains to ensure supplies of essential items, with adequate capacity judged based on emergency needs. Wise politicians will see food and water security as equally important as nuclear and digital technology. How such internal reliance will mesh with existing trade agreements is anyone's guess, but one thing is certain: the post-WWII framework of economic and financial interdependence as the foundations of peace is finished--at least until we see another Eisenhower and Marshall. 

© Matthew Mehdi Rafat (2020) 

Thursday, December 7, 2017

A Primer on Modern History

The study of modern history is needlessly complicated. Unfortunately, most history teachers and professors spent their lives in a few countries or studied only a single subject, rendering them unable to provide the context students so desperately need. I have tried below to provide a straightforward framework acceptable to everyone. Without such a framework, historical understanding will fracture, and humanity will continue to repeat the same mistakes.
Since 1945, every single government and military has been focused on attaining or preventing others from attaining nuclear weapons. After the United States dropped bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending WWII, politicians and military leaders realized existing defense/protection paradigms no longer applied. A country with the most skilled troops, superior munitions, most efficient supply chains, best hygiene (to prevent disease, which often killed more soldiers than active combat), and even superior strategy would not necessarily prevail. Now, only three things mattered: technology and the ability and willingness to use it. Developing brawn had given way to developing brains and gaining (accurate) information.

Military budgets prioritized R&D and began to emphasize covert operations. As governments continued competing for the moral high ground, questions became more complex. When was a first strike politically acceptable? How could one determine whether a recruit would keep secrets? How could countries identify the best minds in the world and entice them to relocate? (e.g., Operation Paperclip) 

Such a shift required a mix of intrigue, psychology, persuasion, media influence, and propaganda. Intelligence communities realized they would be key players in the new paradigm and, in an era prior to CCTVs and ubiquitous technological surveillance, reliable human assets and agents would be the difference between victory and defeat. Furthermore, where soft power and persuasion would not work, assassinations and abductions would--preferably through a third party ally. [Evidence: Operation Damocles; Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16 years-old son; Israel assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists Masoud Alimohammadi, Majid Shahriar, Darioush Rezaeinejad, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, and possibly Ardeshir Hassanpour, mimicking USA's strategy against Germany.] 

Such tactics were not enough for military and intelligence units, which also resorted to false flag operations or coups on a much wider scale. [e.g., Gulf of Tonkin, Lavon Affair/Operation Susannah, 
Operation Ajax (1953), Operation Musketeer (1956)] Facing potential conflicts between civilian and military objectives, democratic regimes sought to limit international interference with domestic governance, causing ideological splits regarding the balance of law, order, and dissent. As domestic resistance increased, it had the potential to upend military alliances post-WWII, which involved important economic treaties and investments. (See “most favored nation” clause, which used USA's stronger currency to tilt trade in its favor: “The American workman, by 1960, had the highest standard of living in the world, and all due to what they genteelly called ‘the most favored nation’ clause in every commercial transaction with the East.” – Philip K. Dick

The failure of Western governments to foresee strong domestic resistance to international policies led to more secrecy in the name of national security, both at home and abroad. The private security industry, not subject to invasive government oversight, began its ascent. British-based Securicor is one example. In 1953, it specialized in delivery and logistics, eventually making its way into the telecom (aka surveillance and data-gathering) business. Today, it is part of G4S, the world's largest security company. With 585,000 employees, G4S is the world's third largest private sector employer and the largest in Europe and Africa. (See the film Logan (2017) for a dystopian view of the possible evolution of private security firms.) 

Returning to the 1960s, covert operations and violations of territorial sovereignty (Operation Menu) became more accepted within governments as the United States began to realize its superior armaments were not enough in Vietnam. As nuclear energy and more lethal weapons accelerated the risks of being outside established alliances, countries and military leaders were forced into one of two camps: pro-Soviet Union (which in practice often meant pro-China) and pro-American. Meanwhile, existing and aspiring world leaders learned that favorable (or in the case of Vietnam, unfavorable) media coverage and asymmetrical warfare—later used by Osama bin Laden—could defeat larger powers or at least convince them to leave. Like private security firms, the general media industries--in this case, television and radio--began their steady ascent. 

Its ability to influence world affairs now jeopardized by increasing Chinese and Soviet influence in Asia and Eastern Europe as well as domestic turmoil, America began addressing matters under its direct control more forcefully. American police started using the same tactics as the military and intelligence communities on their own people. (Potential lesson: once the military uses a particular strategy successfully, it is only a matter of time before the civilian government deploys similar strategies.) 

Surveillance, infiltration, and financially-debilitating lawsuits were used against antiwar groups and activists from MLK to Muhammad Ali to John Lennon. The term “law and order” became a justification for a proxy war against protesters, later morphing into President Reagan’s "War on Drugs." Ironically, countervailing forces that bolstered social change came partly from the military, which had relied on greater female participation in the private workforce during wartime as well as soldiers of color, including but not limited to Jackie Robinson

Politicians like America's Joseph McCarthy had used the media to blacklist anyone deemed an adversarial nonconformist in the 1950s at the same time the Soviet Union and its satellite forces were blacklisting and jailing dissidents.As power-hungry politicians gained more power, propaganda against dissenters became more widespread, with police officers in some jurisdictions ordered to attack nonviolent protestors while federal agencies (J. Edgar Hoover) spied on civil rights leaders. As lines between international and domestic operations blurred, the Watergate scandal was a natural and inevitable result. (See The Most Dangerous Man in America (2009).) 

Were it not for the courageous work of American whistleblowers and journalists (e.g., All the President’s Men (1976)), who often ignored conservative legal advice from their employers, secretive operations would have continued without abatement. Unfortunately, civilian resistance movements against the Eastern Establishment were not as strong as ones in the West, thus preserving the East's status quo--a status quo that would later prove to be unsustainable, essentially bankrupting the Soviet Union and ending its petro-military-industrial economic model. 

In the West, where the status quo was fraying, greater diversity flourished, both strengthening and weakening authoritarian impulses. Taking advantage of distractions in Southeast Asia and Central/South America, some countries decided to cooperate outside U.S. or Soviet-led alliances, much in the same way China would later exploit America’s failure to “pivot to Asia” after the costly and counterproductive 2003 Iraq War. [Examples: creation of ASEAN in 1967; “mid-level” countries like Argentina and Iran working to resume nuclear cooperation, only to see outside events interfere with their relationships, such as the Buenos Aires 1992 embassy bombing, in which neither Argentina nor Iran strangely derived any benefit.]

In 1973, the OPEC embargo added yet another disruptor to the existing world order, namely the integrity of the oil supply chain, which formed the underlying basis of U.S. dollar strength and numerous economic treaties. Post-Nixon and the cessation of active armed conflict between West and East, economic statecraft became the way forward, with America’s mighty Navy and more developed financial markets giving the West a clear advantage. Trade, oil, weapons development, and continued control of nuclear energy would dominate international relations until the birth of the internet in the 1990s. The formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991 provided America with the opportunity to create what President George Bush, formerly the CIA's Director, called a “new world order” on September 11, 1990, a period lasting until September 11, 2001. America's 2003 invasion of Iraq, driven by falsified pretenses, shattered America's reputation, allowing other countries to vie for global dominance. And here we are

© Matthew Mehdi Rafat (2017)

Bonus: another historical pattern is that when two countries enter into a treaty—whether to avoid war or after a conflict—often only one party intends on upholding the terms. The other party uses the break in tensions to disarm—both literally and figuratively—the other signatory, eventually invading the former enemy and prevailing through political chicanery.

Bonus: when we hear the term, "divide and conquer," we typically understand the term absent historical context. After WWII, the British, despite prevailing, were in debt and could not maintain their empire, which once spanned a quarter of the globe. They attempted to break up or partition several areas in order to more easily manage them and to allow Western powers to maintain naval supremacy. Singapore's break from Malaysia is one example--keep the port, leave the land. Divide and conquer. Yet, even with lesser security obligations, European powers, particularly the British and the French, could not afford empire status. By the time of the Vietnam War, Europe had effectively handed off empire duties and corresponding security--both for Westerners living abroad as well as Western-owned businesses--to the United States. 

Bonus: from Allison J. Truitt's Dreaming of Money in Ho Chi Minh City (2013): "The United States' massive military expenditures in Southeast Asia led to the collapse of its ability to maintain the dollar's fixed value relative to gold. When the US government put an end to the dollar's convertibility in 1971, it ushered in a new era of more flexible and more volatile exchange rates." 

Bonus: counterpoint from Singapore's Kishore Mahbubani's Has the West Lost It? (2018)

Bonus
: if you enjoyed this post, you may also like this one: Ports, Finance, Power, and Free Trade

Bonus: "History... is not merely something to be read... On the contrary, the great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we do.  It could scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames of reference, our identities, and our aspirations." -- James Baldwin, USA (1965) 

Friday, November 10, 2017

Georgia: Desperately Seeking the EU but Enjoying its Independence

When I landed in Tbilisi, Georgia, I expected cows, green pastures, and funny-looking hats. 
*Not* what Georgians actually wear.

Instead, I saw a modern airport with far too many Mercedes-Benzes in the parking lot and widespread use of RFID-enabled payment systems. Interestingly, Tbilisi is closer to a cashless society than America, and one reason PayPal is valued more than AMEX is because the future doesn't involve credit cards per se, but the technology that allows payments to occur. 

In any case, in Tbilisi, many people speak three languages (Russian, Georgian, and English); are wary of Russia; can't say no to Russian money; and desperate to join the EU. Such conflicting characteristics create unique experiences. The most interesting Georgian citizen I met was an ethnic German raised by a Jewish grandmother in Russia who speaks better Russian than Georgian. The day before, I had met a Muslim Georgian-Ukrainian software tester working for a Danish company who attended Turkish primary school. She speaks four languages fluently. 

After a tour of the local Supreme Court, which includes a museum housing a Soviet-era courtroom, I told my translator the United States had surrounded Russia with military bases, implying America was becoming the new and overextended Soviet Union. Her response? "You [America] should conquer them!" 
FYI Joseph Stalin was Georgian, born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili. 
Despite its history of conflict with the Soviet Union, or perhaps because of it, Tbilisi has become a hybrid of Russian and American influences. Freedom Square is next to Pushkin Square, named after a Russian poet. The beautiful parks I saw were designed by Russians, not Europeans or Americans. The long, foreboding escalators to underground metro stations were also made by the Soviet Union and still in use. 
Afraid of heights? Too bad.

Unfortunately, not all of Georgia's Soviet influence can be praised. Witness the utilitarian block-shaped housing structures and, believe it or not, coin-operated elevators. 
The one Georgian lari is inserted in the contraption on the right.

If I have unduly focused on Russia in a piece about Georgia, it's because the country was under Soviet occupation from 1921 to 1991, with the Soviet army entering as recently as 1989 to quell inter-ethnic conflict in the bloody Sukhumi riots between Abkhazians and Georgians

History does not forget, and in 1992-1993, similar tensions flared up, leading to war in the Abkhazia region. The failure of diplomats to create an effective post-war framework presumably led to the 2008 Russo-Georgian crisis, which, depending on whom you ask, centered on Russia's desire to expand its territory, Georgia's failure to abide by the terms of its Gazprom contract, and/or the Abkhazians' desire for independence and their alleged claims of mistreatment by Georgians. 

Not until 2012, when billionaire philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili's "Georgian Dream" team swept elections, did Georgia finally look to be on its way to prosperity. (Note: many billionaires have Russian ties--Ivanishvili went to Moscow to pursue a Ph.D. in economics and made his fateful business connections there.) 

Before we discuss the fun stuff, let us have a quick Georgian history lesson. Around 1800, having been invaded by the Persians, Arabs, Turks, and Mongols, Georgia asked the Russian Empire to enter and protect it from outsiders: "At the end of the 18th century, Georgia... united herself to Russia of her own accord, on condition that Russia should defend her against her external foes." (Act of Independence of Georgia in Georgian National Museum, Soviet Occupation exhibit.) (I just realized I should have titled this article, "Let the Right One In.") 

The post-WWI climate, especially from 1918 to 1920, must have created issues because in May 1920, the Soviet Union's Red Army invaded Georgia and took Tbilisi by force. 
Lenin approved the invasion on the condition that it be a guaranteed victory, and the Red Army delivered. The results of the ensuing occupation were disastrous, with the Bolsheviks purging elites, church leaders, and intellectuals. 
The Bolsheviks didn't stop at murder--they also violated the cardinal rules of peaceful governance: 1) leave religion alone; and 2) don't raise taxes excessively. 
Consequently, as far back as 1936(!), Georgians were asking Americans to assist them. Had Germany not presented more problems than the Soviet Union in 1938, Georgian history might have been different. In 1941, however, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and though the Soviets defeated the Nazis, they lost 26 to 27 million Soviet lives in the process. Considering the Soviet Union's sacrifices, as well as its status as WWII victor alongside the United States, it must have been difficult for any country to openly interfere with the Soviet Union post-1945. 

Why does Georgia in particular have such a turbulent history? Although it lacks substantial natural resources outside the disputed area inhabited by Abkhazians, it's an important trade route and now delivers substantial natural gas to the EU. (The contract establishing Georgian payment and obligations for transit of Russian natural gas to the EU is fascinating, even if you're not a lawyer.) Aside from Georgia's competitive "New Silk Road" location, it has excellent wine, beer, and tea, none of which are exported widely for some strange reason.

How does all this affect you, an aspiring world traveler looking for interesting destinations? For its level of infrastructure, Georgia is inexpensive. Hipsters have taken over, gentrification is on its way, and soon Georgia may get its wish and become just like any other boring Western European city. As of today, however, I was stunned by how much beautiful artwork is displayed everywhere and casually so. Take a look at a few pieces I saw while strolling around Tbilisi. 

Mziuri Park
Hey, if a Dunkin' Donuts sign in magical-looking Georgian script isn't art, what is?
Tbilisi's most attractive feature isn't its low prices but its understated cosmopolitanism. While the current American president talks about building walls, Georgians probably love Americans because they told the Soviet Union to tear one down

My favorite bookstore, Prospero's Books and Caliban's Coffeehouse--English majors, commence mental orgasms--is owned by a Russian woman who sells pocket booklets of the U.S. Constitution. I am sitting there now, next to two attractive brunettes who have glossy Russian language magazines on their table. (Do I dare disturb them in a minute?) 

I would tell you much more about Tbilisi, but I can't add anything you can't easily discover yourself once you arrive. An airport ride to the city center should cost no more than 35 lari. There's no Uber, but there is Maxim. Stay near Rustaveli Avenue or Freedom Square--every major museum and tourist attraction is nearby, including the very touristy Meidan Bazaar. Don't miss the G. Leonidze Museum of Georgian Literature, which doesn't have books but does have interesting exhibitions (after seeing one about snipers on the Armenian-Azeri border, I've decided I'll never live near a border) and a cool cafe outside. The Museum's staff-only viewable artwork on the walls are more beautiful than ones in the MOMA. 
Incredible painting. "Pushkin in Tbilisi" by  Lado Gudiashvili.

If you are rich, stay at the Biltmore Hotel (there are two locations--the MoMa design is the new building, but I like the old one on Rustaveli Ave.); otherwise, check out Airbnb or Radisson Blu (also near Rustaveli Avenue) or perhaps the trendy Fabrika Hostel.

See the churches--the most beautiful ones are the Holy Trinity Church (aka Sameba) and Sioni Cathedral. 

Georgian wedding--a common occurrence on weekends.
Find a priest who chants Biblical verses in the ceremony for the full experience.
Mkskheta is a small city close to Tbilisi and easy to visit. Signagi and Svaneti (don't miss tasting/smelling Svanuri marili aka Svan salt!) are popular destinations as well. Batumi is a beach town apparently fun to visit in the summer. 10% of Georgians are Muslims and many reside in Akhaltsikhe (New Castle). If you go to New Castle, Vardzia is nearby. 

When in Tbilisi, walk into the "basement bakeries." Occasionally, you'll see steps leading underground to brick-walled restaurants or stores. I've never been disappointed by any of the commercial basement dwellings I've found. 
Eat khinkhali, khachapuri, and churchkhela with flavored soda (most popular flavor is cream, and it's usually only one lari). At times, it seems Georgian cuisine requires at least two sticks of butter in each dish--I couldn't finish my portions--but at least you won't go hungry. 
Khinkhali
Adjarian khachapuri
So what is Georgia, other than eager to forge its place in the world? Imagine a place built by the Soviet Union, infused with hipsterism, yearning to be free like Americans, having a language derived from the Greeks, and being flooded by foreign capital. In short, Georgia's future is not set in stone, and its magical realism won't last much longer. If you want to visit, do it soon so you can see Tbilisi as what Europe ought to be--young, naive enough to believe in America's stated ideals, and doing its best to combine the old with the new.
© Matthew Mehdi Rafat (2017)

Update: I just got a sulfur bath, and I feel great. I've had the Turkish hammam experience, but it didn't do much for me. The Georgian sulfur bath is different--your body absorbs some of the sulfur, which, depending on your skin type, will generate some noticeable effect. (My skin felt nice in a way I can't exactly describe.) 


You pay between 35 to 100 lari for a private room, depending on the number of people and the size of the room and bath. If it's just you and a friend, you may pay 35 lari. You can check out the bath before you decide which room you want. Towels and soap costs extra, about 2 lari each. If the water in the bath is too hot, try to adjust it by turning on the cold water tap that goes into the small pool. 
100 lari, high-end sulfur bath. Room next to it had several comfy chairs.
Not the one I used.

You will get your towel, enter the room, lock the door, strip, put on the slippers provided for you, and submerge yourself into the small sulfur pool. You have up to one hour, but half an hour was enough for me. A massage costs extra. (The Georgians claim to have their own massage technique, but they've just tried to copy the Thais.) After you finish sitting and relaxing in the small pool, you will take a shower (if you want soap, remember to buy it beforehand), dress, and leave. You'll probably be quite thirsty. I liked the experience, and I felt more relaxed afterwards.

What should you not do in Tbilisi? Strip clubs. There are two nearby the Rustaveli metro stop, one called Venus and another called Matine(?). I paid 30 lari to enter, and only four women were inside. One of the women sat next to me, and after I confirmed the drink she wanted was only 30 lari, she ordered. I received a bill for 1200 lari, and I had to waste 20 minutes of my time playing dumb until they let me go. (They only let me go when I texted my location to a local Georgian friend. Thank you, WhatsApp.) My Turkish-Arab friend living in Georgia told me some of these places even scam visiting Georgians, and he'd heard of one club threatening a tourist until he paid 400 USD.